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 When Morocco annexed the territory of the former Spanish Western 
Sahara in 1976, the country eliminated the colonial border established 
by France and Spain situated at latitude 27° 40′. Thanks to this mea-
sure, which put an end to a brief separation of only 18 years, relations 
between Sahrawi communities from southern Morocco and the former 
Spanish colony were re-established, families were reunited and population 
movements began almost immediately. However, this partial reuni" cation 
took place at a time of crisis and caused the Sahrawi society to fracture 
in a new way, beset by war and con# ict. 1 One of the consequences was 
that Sahrawi nationalist activism in territories under Moroccan control 
has involved not only Sahrawis from the former Spanish colony but also 
southern Moroccan Sahrawis. The latter group has not only become inte-
grated into a reconstituted Sahrawi society in the territory, but some have 
fully incorporated themselves into the political movement based in the 
occupied territory and aligned with the positions of the Polisario Front. 
This political phenomenon, which began with and has developed along-
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side the con# ict, has been v implications and raises varied and signi" cant 
questions. This chapter poses one key question along with two of lesser 
consequence. The " rst is whether this dimension is intrinsic to the con# ict 
and is now becoming more visible or if it is a new phenomenon by which 
the Sahrawi nationalist camp is expanding, as a result of the prolongation 
of the dispute. The other two questions are related to how these southern 
Moroccan Sahrawis have made a speci" c contribution to the creation of a 
modern Sahrawi national identity and the possible consequences of their 
involvement in the nationalist struggle for the resolution of the con# ict. 
 THE SAHRAWI PEOPLE AND THE TERRITORY 
 European colonialism delimited the territory of the western part of the 
Sahara desert and much later named it Western Sahara. The territory that 
came under Spanish rule in 1884—although it only became progressively 
controlled beginning in the 1930s—was inhabited by an indigenous popu-
lation, the  bidani (white, Hassaniya-speaking nomads with a unique tribal 
organization). The Spanish Western Sahara did not include the entire ter-
ritory inhabited by this people, some of whom lived on land under French 
colonial control in the northeast, east and south. The French and Spanish 
colonialisms in the area assigned the western part of the Sahara through 
different treaties, and between 1900 and 1912, they drew political bor-
ders on a territory that had not had them before. They " rst established 
the limits of their colonial possessions before later delimiting the Spanish 
Protectorate in southern Morocco (between the Draa River and latitude 
27° 40′), which had a different legal status from the Spanish Sahara (pro-
tectorate vs. colony). Later, when states in the region successively became 
independent, Spain was forced to cede to Morocco the Protectorate pos-
sessions, including Cape Juby-Tarfaya in 1958 and then the enclave of Ifni 
in 1969. 2 Spain pulled out of Western Sahara in February 1976 and the 
territory was split between Morocco and Mauritania. Finally, the current 
de facto limits took shape when Mauritania withdrew and Morocco built 
defensive walls (or berm) to separate the areas under its control from the 
narrow strip of land dominated by the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic 
(RASD)  (Benna# a  2013 ). While these borders meant very little for the 
indigenous population for a long time, after independence, the indigenous 
people living in the territories of the new states were assigned a new citi-
zenship. This was augmented by the fact that Morocco became a refuge 
for Sahrawis # eeing from the Spanish colony mainly in the 1960s. 
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 On the other hand, Western Sahara did not experience decolonization; 
when the Spanish colonizers withdrew in 1976, it became occupied by 
Morocco and Mauritania, which claimed these territories using arguments 
based on historical ties. The indigenous population in the colony was not 
allowed to decide its own future as established by international law. As a 
result of this frustrated decolonization, the occupation and the war, one 
part stayed in the territory under the control of the occupier and the other 
crossed international borders into exile. Beyond this, a fraction of the 
indigenous Sahrawi population was already living in areas that had formed 
part of the southern portion of the Moroccan state since 1958. This group 
is the focus of this chapter. 
 Historically, the Sahrawi population has been distributed over a broad 
territory that is dif" cult to delimit between the southern slopes of the Atlas 
Mountains in Morocco down to modern-day Mauritania and entering south-
east Algeria. Establishing these colonial—and later state—borders instigated 
a relative fragmentation of the Sahrawi populations that took some time to 
become clear-cut. The signi" cance of the colonial borders was strengthened, 
not only because refuge could be found beyond them but also because for 
modern pro-independence Sahrawis it delimited the territory on which to 
establish the state project that should have emerged from the decoloniza-
tion of Spanish Sahara. Spain’s late colonialism caused a national liberation 
movement to take shape among the indigenous population who demanded 
their right to independence, but demarcated by the colony and not the ances-
tral territory of the “ethnic Sahrawis”. In 1973 the  Frente Popular para la 
Liberación de Saguia El Hamra y Rio de Oro (Polisario Front) was created, 
" rst to oppose Spanish colonialism and then the Moroccan and Mauritanian 
occupiers. In this con# ict, Morocco argued that the territory had formed part 
of the kingdom for centuries, considering its appropriation the culmination 
of decolonization. The most brutal fragmentation of the indigenous popula-
tion occurred with the exodus caused by the war and the establishment of a 
large number of Sahrawi refugees in southwest Algeria beginning in 1976. 
The Sahrawis, therefore, have been subjected to a multiple fragmentation: 
" rst the colonial and independence periods saw a fragmentation of the ethnic 
group between Morocco, the Spanish Sahara, Algeria and Mauritania, and 
then during the national liberation movement, the occupation and the war, 
the colonial population was again split up between those who went into exile 
and those who stayed in the territory. 
 The Moroccan-Sahrawi con# ict can also be characterized by its length. 
The " rst phase (1976–1991) included armed confrontation between the 
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Polisario Front and Morocco-Mauritania. The second, beginning in 1991, 
has been characterized by a situation of no-war/no-peace with a cease-
" re agreement and negotiations led by the United Nations, including the 
implementation of a settlement plan, deadlock, successive proposals and 
several rounds of later conversations with no signi" cant results. The pro-
longation of the con# ict has affected the parties in numerous ways. During 
this time the presence of the Moroccan occupiers and de facto annexation 
of the territory have consolidated with people from the north moving 
in, making important investments in infrastructure, setting up institu-
tions, deploying military and security forces in the area and exploiting its 
natural resources. 3 This entrenchment, however, has not normalized the 
situation. Policies of positive discrimination have generated suspicion in 
Morocco, tensions with the indigenous population persist, settlers who 
have not received the promised bene" ts are discontented, police control 
is systematic and the political liberalization enjoyed in the public arena in 
Morocco in recent years has been very limited in the Sahrawi areas, both 
in southern Morocco and in the occupied territory. In turn, the power 
groups and Sahrawi elites in the occupied zones have had different experi-
ences in their collaboration with Rabat. 
 On the Sahrawi side, the prolongation of this situation has created 
new dynamics and tensions. For four decades, the Polisario Front—as the 
Sahrawi national liberation movement—has played a leading role in resist-
ing and demanding independence in international forums and has created 
a state in exile, the RASD, organizing the exiled population in southwest 
Algeria and the so-called liberated zones and carrying out important dip-
lomatic work. During this time, the Polisario Front has not been immune 
to occasional internal tensions. Both in the occupied territory and the 
Tindouf refugee camps, the civil population has grown weary. 
 THE BREAKDOWN OF BORDERS AND THE PROTEST 
MOVEMENT 
 The protracted occupation has had at least two effects. The " rst is the 
rise of a Sahrawi protest movement led by a range of actors, most nota-
bly young people who did not live through the Spanish colonial period 
and were born or socialized under Moroccan rule. While this collective 
action takes advantage of the Moroccan political framework (creating dif-
ferent types of associations), its undeniable political reference point is the 
Polisario Front, although structural links are relative and limited, making 
it a target of repression. On the other hand, the occupying authorities and 
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the  pro-Moroccan Sahrawi elites have assumed that an identity compo-
nent exists that can be stimulated or contained with various public poli-
cies, sinecures or positive discrimination measures; in other words, a sort 
of instrumental use of (or bargaining around) Sahrawi identity has become 
normalized and accepted within the Moroccan political framework. 4 
 The Sahrawi (i.e. national) political identity is a recent phenomenon, 
to a large extent the result of late colonialization and frustrated decolo-
nization. Before and during a large part of the colonial period, it was not 
possible to speak of a Sahrawi national awareness per se, but rather of tra-
ditional identities based on differentiated cultural practices (the Hassaniya 
language) and tribal membership. In fact, the most widespread name was 
 Ahel es-Sahel (“people of the west” or “people of the littoral”), a term that 
refers to their geographic location in Hassaniya. The Hassaniya-speaking 
Saharan area, the “Sahrawi cultural territory” was called  Sahil (littoral) or 
 Trab al-Bidan ( bidan refers to the white Arab population). The “Sahrawi 
nation” is a modern concept, a uni" er of the pre-existing ethnic diversity 
connected to the anti-colonial movement and resistance. The awareness 
of “nation” emerged as a result of the rapid social changes caused by the 
late Spanish colonialism in the indigenous society and the international 
context. This modern Sahrawi national identity began to be articulated 
in the 1960s and then more clearly in the 1970s with the independence 
movement, the war for liberation and the creation of the RASD (Brousky 
2007). Sahrawi nationalism is not ethnic, but postcolonial, (re)construct-
ing the community and creating a nation to provide it with an elaborate 
form of organization (a modern state) for which it had to emancipate itself 
beforehand (achieve liberation, decolonization). 
 Sahrawi nationalism demands the self-determination of the Sahrawi 
people in the application of UN Resolution 1514 (1960), but it was born 
and developed beyond the territorial framework of the colony. The move-
ment crystallized both in Spanish Western Sahara and in the Sahrawi areas 
of southern Morocco and, accordingly, since the beginning Sahrawi mili-
tants from both areas have made up the Polisario Front. Moreover, for 
military reasons, during the military confrontation (1976–1991), armed 
actions took place both in the occupied zones and in southern Morocco 
(Tan-Tan, Tarfaya, Draa, Akka, Tata, Lemseyid, Ras el Janfra, Leboirat, 
Zak and so on). 5 However, the Polisario Front has always aligned itself 
with the " ght for the self-determination of the indigenous population in 
the territory of the former Spanish colony within the parameters of the 
national " ght for decolonization, accepting the inheritance and intangibil-
ity of the colonial borders (Hodges  1983 ; Mundy  2007 ). 
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 This inevitably led to a distinction between the Sahrawi population on 
the territory that would form the basis of the future state—and, there-
fore, the population with the right to self-determination—and the (eth-
nic) Sahrawis living outside this territory who do not have that right. The 
Polisario Front has not made this distinction explicit (some Sahrawis vs. 
others), but the group’s political discourse has always speci" ed the limits 
of the territory of the future state. The declarations made by the Polisario 
Front (the 1973 Constituent Congress, subsequent congresses) and the 
founding texts of the RASD (the 1976 declaration of the RASD, the 1976 
constitution and later versions, presidential declarations) always refer to 
the colonial territory and clearly identify the “national territory” with a 
territory “with internationally recognized borders”. In other words, they 
accept the idea of a nation-state inherited from the colony, a nation with 
the right to independence tied to the colonial territory and not the cultural 
(ethnic) territory. This underscores the concept of territorial integrity/
unity as opposed to any possible partitions of the territory. This distinction 
is made continually in every discourse. Consequently, part of the nation 
will be left outside of the state. 
 The political action of Sahrawi nationalism, therefore, spills over geo-
graphically. Since its origins, it has simultaneously taken place within the 
colony and outside of it. However, the exile of the part of the popula-
tion that has settled in southwest Algeria and the creation of the RASD, 
whose institutions are in Tindouf, have placed the nerve centre of the 
nationalist movement outside the disputed territory since 1976, in con-
trast to the battle" eld (the occupied zones, the incursion zones) and 
the liberated zones. The RASD has, to some extent, been a state that 
controls a limited territory with a divided and dispersed population and 
its institutions in exile. 
 Similar to what occurred in Palestine in 1986 with the First Intifada 
uprising, in Western Sahara blocked negotiations contributed to a change 
in political initiative, led to that point by the Polisario Front from abroad. 
Beginning in September 1999 and then more clearly after May and June 
2005, the population in the occupied territory took on a greater role. One 
key element was the emergence of a new anti-establishment political elite 
in Western Sahara made up of former resistance " ghters (who had been 
jailed in the two preceding decades) and young people (many of them uni-
versity students educated in Morocco, the bene" ciaries of promotion and 
co-optation policies). This phenomenon became known as the “Sahrawi 
Intifada” or “Independence Intifada”. 
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 With the failure of the settlement plan, the nationalist protests and 
demands spread inside the territory, and after 2005, demonstrations in 
the occupied zones grew in prominence. Given the impossibility of openly 
addressing nationalist demands, the collective action focused on socioeco-
nomic demands and the defence of human rights. Sahrawi human rights 
political activists became particularly visible internationally; their stories 
have been disseminated, they participate in international forums and they 
have received international awards and recognition. The response of the 
Moroccan authorities has essentially been to repress these movements and 
close down spaces, feeding the spiral of confrontation. However, what is 
most interesting in the context of this study is the involvement of southern 
Moroccan Sahrawis in the nationalist protests. 
 Who are these southern Moroccan Sahrawis? The region that goes from 
the southern # ank of the Atlas Mountains, Oued Noun, to the border with 
the former Spanish Sahara has traditionally been inhabited, to a lesser or 
greater extent, by Hassaniya speakers, as distinguished from the Berbers to 
the north (Naïmi  2005 ,  2013 ). The area south of the Draa River formed 
part of the Spanish Protectorate until 1958 with a border at latitude 27° 40′ 
that separated some Sahrawi groups from others. 6 In the late 1950s and early 
1960s, the traditional population movements in the area were joined by new 
ones as Sahrawis from different tribal groups from Spanish Sahara arrived in 
southern Morocco both for economic (displaced by drought) and political 
reasons (members of the Sahrawi Liberation Army, or ALS, exiles and refu-
gees), 7 creating a demographic mosaic of indigenous Sahrawis and immi-
grant Sahrawis (the so-called implanted population) who maintained ties 
with their place and tribe of origin. After 1958 these Sahrawis, living on the 
extreme periphery of the country, were politically and economically margin-
alized. Somehow or other they resisted acculturation policies (the insistence 
on assimilating/Moroccanizing or “de- Hassanizing ” them with regard to 
their customs, language and clothing) and political repression. Rabat has 
always been somewhat detached from the southern province, the refuge of 
former ALS members hostile to the central power. The different composi-
tion of the population has characterized the human landscape of the region 8 
and has been a factor in the political behaviour of the population. This also 
produced the diversity of criteria between the parties during the identi" -
cation process carried out by the UN for the independence referendum. 9 
 Any analysis of the Sahrawi political protest movement in southern Morocco 
must take this situation into account. Furthermore, several questions need to 
be answered: is this a simple marginal contagion (of no consequence), tactical 
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mimesis (adopting the forms, but with different objectives) or a true identi" -
cation and convergence tied to feelings of belonging recovered and nurtured 
in a new context? There are at least three explanatory elements to consider: 
identi" cation, territorial continuity and the new inter-Sahrawi socialization 
produced by the occupation. Firstly, in terms of persistence of a common 
Sahrawi cultural identity (language, practices, customs, family ties) across 
the region, no one doubts the “Sahrawi-ness” (of the identity) of southern 
Moroccan Sahrawis who in turn are fully aware that they share a cultural 
identity with the Sahrawis in occupied Western Sahara, Mauritania and south-
ern Algeria (Julien  2004 ; Yara  2001 ). Secondly, there has been continuity in 
human movements in the heart of the Hassaniya-speaking space. The new 
colonial and state political borders in the Sahrawi space were always penetra-
ble; nomadism, trade, family displacement and social and matrimonial rela-
tionships continued. Between 1958 and 1976, the border limited—but did 
not impede—relationships between northern and southern Sahrawis. Before 
1958 Sahrawis from Saguia el-Hamra or further south regularly sold their 
livestock and picked up provisions in cities like Tan-Tan, a practice that has 
continued. Sahrawis in Spanish Western Sahara had to obtain permission from 
the Spanish authorities to travel north. In the opposite direction, obtaining 
permits was more complex and depended on other authorities in an attempt 
to limit the entry of Moroccans or non-subject Sahrawis. There was also legal 
trade operated by Sahrawis and Moroccans who crossed the border with sup-
plies (food and other products) as well as unsupervised crossings made, for 
example, by shepherds, smugglers and activists. 
 Thirdly, with the occupation, Morocco fully re-established territorial 
continuity and endeavoured to erase the traces of the colonial border, 
establishing new administrative provincial and regional limits and creat-
ing electoral constituencies that straddle the colonial border. After 1976 
the southern Moroccan and Western Saharan Sahrawis had no trouble 
maintaining contact and exchanges; in fact, mobility between the north 
and south intensi" ed and the same spaces were shared. Sahrawi families 
moved and resettled with north-south movements predominating: in 
large part encouraged by the authorities, Sahrawis from Tarfaya, Tan-Tan 
and Guelmin settled in the cities of El Ayun, Smara and Dakhla drawn 
by state projects, the Moroccan administration and trade. In fact, the 
Moroccan settlers were either coming from northern Morocco (the so- 
called northerners) or southern Moroccan Sahrawis. 10 Many exiles to 
southern Morocco in the 1960s–1970s have returned to El Ayun, Dakhla 
and Smara. The less active south-north movement is more related to civil 
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servants sent to Moroccan cities or students who live in university cities 
for a few years. This two-direction phenomenon has made it possible to 
recover ties and establish new networks, developing relationships between 
Sahrawis at all levels. There is no doubt that this has strengthened Sahrawi 
identity among the people in southern Morocco who perceive themselves 
to be marginalized with respect to their fellow citizens in the north, while 
closer to their fellow citizens in the south. Moreover, southern Sahrawi 
Morocco is quite close to El Ayun, the main city in occupied Western 
Sahara and the main focus of political protest movements. Finally, the 
new co-opted Sahrawi elites in the occupied zones who have bene" tted 
from political or economic sinecures and high positions in the Moroccan 
administration also include southern Moroccan Sahrawis. 
 The politicization and political protest movement among the south-
ern Moroccan Sahrawis—whether indigenous or the implanted popula-
tion, residing in southern Morocco or having relocated to the occupied 
zones—are related to this new reality (Cherkaoui  2007 ; Mundy  2012 ). 
There are two key factors here: " rstly, in some cases it is possible to iden-
tify elements that correspond to processes of re-identi" cation or identity 
recovery (ethnogenesis); and secondly, the social and political mobiliza-
tion corresponds to the same causes at the root of the protest movement 
in occupied Western Sahara and develops in the same way in terms of 
frustration, identi" cation and nationalization:
•  Frustration: they feel dissatis" ed and suffer from shortages (socioeco-
nomic grievances, unemployment); 11 they are frustrated and feel alien-
ated with respect to the political system and institutions and are aware 
that they are discriminated against (limited citizenship, non- recognition 
of their differentiated identity) and marginalized by the state; 
•  Identi" cation: they experience the same forms of repression (the 
closing of spaces and restricted freedoms, direct, collective and fam-
ily repression, detentions and deaths at the hands of law enforcement 
of" cials) and therefore see parallels in the causes behind the repres-
sion, interpreting their situation as deriving from their condition as 
Sahrawis (Beristain and Gonzalez 2012; Yara  2003 ); 
•  Nationalization of the protest: in many cases they couch (whether 
for tactical purposes or not) their protests and social or economic 
demands in identity-related elements, even occasionally wielding 
openly nationalist symbology and slogans (Sahrawi # ags, catch-
phrases, explicit support for the Polisario Front). 
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Finally, Sahrawi activists are found in the same associations and share 
discourses with a strategic nationalist background. However, although 
the mobilizations of the Sahrawis from the north are not substantially 
different from those of the southern Sahrawis, the latter are usually 
eclipsed by the dynamics in the occupied territory. 
 AN INDISTINGUISHABLE COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 The political protests and mobilization of southern Moroccan Sahrawis can 
be described and characterized as follows in terms of temporary location, 
geographic location, actors, repertoires of collective action and visibility: 
 As far as temporary location is concerned, the roots of Sahrawi nation-
alism (the " rst cells, some of the founders and early Polisario Front 
militants) are largely located in southern Morocco. After the Moroccan 
invasion, the nationalist involvement of southern Moroccan Sahrawis was 
indistinguishable from that of the occupied territory and a large number 
of Sahrawi nationalist activists who suffered repression in the 1970s–1980s 
(political prisoners, disappeared) were from or lived in this area. When the 
protests reappeared in the 1990s, they occurred in both areas. In 1992, 
there were demonstrations in cities like Assa 12 and the " rst Sahrawi inti-
fada in September 1999 also was replicated in demonstrations in Tan-Tan 
and Guelmin. The protests and repression also affect cities in southern 
Morocco on a constant basis; as a result of the intifada of May 2005, for 
example, police repression in the area increased. Southern Morocco has 
always been part of the Sahrawi protest scene. 
 With regard to geographic location, for the Sahrawis their territory goes 
“from Guelmin towards the south”. In this space, collective action follows 
the same pattern: it is essentially urban, in cities and small towns where 
the population is concentrated. In southern Morocco, organized activism 
and mobilizations have materialized in places ranging from Tarfaya to the 
Draa area (Tan-Tan, Assa), Guelmin, Zak, Akka and M’hamid El Ghizlane 
and all the way to Agadir. Moreover, university students regularly travel to 
campuses at Agadir, Marrakech, Casablanca and Rabat. 
 When it comes to protest movement actors, while the leadership is shared 
between former victims of political repression and young leaders, the activ-
ists and actors in the protests are essentially people younger than 30. Many 
of them live in Moroccan cities for work or school and are prone to add-
ing an identity element to their general frustration. Additionally, these activ-
ists circulate between the north and the south, with some from Western 
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Sahara living in southern Morocco and vice versa. An important portion of 
the directors of the nationalist organizations in the occupied territory did, in 
fact, come from southern Morocco to settle in El Ayun or Smara after 1976. 
These organizations operate where there is a Sahrawi population, both in the 
territory of the former Spanish colony and in southern Morocco. 
 In terms of repertoires and patterns of collective action, the practices in 
southern Morocco are similar to those of activists in Western Sahara (dem-
onstrations, " ling complaints) and are not speci" c to southern Morocco. 
As in the occupied Western Sahara, demonstrations (both spontaneous and 
planned) have increased in frequency and visibility and have diversi" ed. The 
use of electronic resources (photos, videos, the Internet, social networks) 
when " ling complaints has become more widespread and the reactions 
among the population have also intensi" ed, with occasional outbreaks of 
violence. The use of nationalist symbology (graf" ti, # ags) has proliferated in 
many cities in southern Morocco. All of these expressions have elicited reac-
tions from the authorities and, usually, repression, which feeds the nation-
alist protest spiral. Rather than being a phenomenon of simultaneity or a 
north-south network of social and political activism, it is all part of the same 
dynamic. The same patterns also appear in how the protests evolve from local 
demands to openly nationalist protests: (a) the root causes and circumstantial 
triggers (the protests often emerge as a reaction to socioeconomic factors, 
unemployment and demands for scholarships or transport and are exacer-
bated by speci" c incidents); (b) added to this are demonstrations of solidarity 
with the repression where it occurs, usually in the occupied zone; and (c) 
being sti# ed, the protests nationalize; the lack of means of expression con-
tributes to nationalization (accompanied by pro-independence symbology) 
and radicalization, with contemptuous displays and open support for the 
pro-independence cause (Zunes and Barka  2009 ; Zunes and Mundy  2010 ). 
 A " nal feature is indistinct visibility. The activists are usually de" ned as 
Sahrawis from the Sahara or from a particular city, without establishing 
whether they come from the occupied territory or Morocco. Consequently, 
southern Moroccan Sahrawis do not have their own discourse or a dif-
ferentiated activism; the action of Sahrawis from the north and south is 
a simultaneous and joint action. The most representative social organi-
zations in the occupied territory include southern Moroccan Sahrawis 
without any distinction. 13 They also participate together in international 
missions to condemn the situation in Western Sahara. In fact, several of 
the most important and well-known " gures of the internal opposition are 
from southern Moroccan cities, some of whom moved to El Ayun, while 
others live in their places of origin. 14 
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 This means that a very signi" cant portion of the Sahrawis imprisoned 
for nationalist activism comes from southern Morocco, as a close analysis of 
the political prisoners and activists in the last decade shows. In September 
2005 of the 36 Sahrawi political prisoners listed by human rights associa-
tions, at least eight came from southern Morocco. 15 In 2006 (May–August) 
of the 35 Sahrawi political prisoners identi" ed by the Committee for the 
Defence of the Right to Self-Determination for the People of Western Sahara 
(CODAPSO), 17 were Sahrawis from southern Morocco. 16 The report done 
by the Moroccan Association of Human Rights (AMDH) in 2008 on the 
human rights situation in Morocco lists 30 Sahrawi political prisoners, of 
whom 15 were from or arrested in towns in southern Morocco. 17 Finally, 
in 2010 the Association of Families of Saharawi Prisoners and Disappeared 
(AFAPREDESA) identi" ed 24 Sahrawi political prisoners, of whom at least 
nine came from southern Morocco. Moreover, three of the 25 prisoners 
jailed for the Gdeim Izik protest were from southern Morocco. This is also 
re# ected in the list of activists killed during these years. 
 A COMPONENT OF THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT 
 The Moroccan annexation-occupation and the disappearance of the bor-
der entailed a de facto reuni" cation of the Sahrawis. Over time this has 
also allowed part of the population from southern Morocco to partici-
pate in nationalist mobilizations and support pro-independence positions. 
Despite the fact that southern Morocco does not form part of the occu-
pied territory, these Sahrawis have not structured their own differentiated 
discourse within the national movement. They maintain the exact same 
discourse since they identify what they experience in their cities (poverty, 
marginalization) with the situation in the occupied zones. They often 
use nationalist symbology (RASD # ags in demonstrations and indoor 
celebrations, slogans, artistic expressions) and openly express their sup-
port for the self-determination of Western Sahara and the Polisario Front 
in an advanced and subversive level of public demonstration. Neither is 
there any irredentist discourse, 18 which seems to indicate that for now 
the Sahrawis accept the colonial borders and the territory of the future 
Sahrawi state. This is despite the fact that frustration, the violation of 
rights and repression have resulted in signi" cant emigration among young 
people and occasional cases of # eeing to the refugee camps in Tindouf; 
that is, they are opting to support a Sahrawi national state project that 
initially excludes them. 
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 In view of this, the Polisario Front national liberation movement has 
maintained a discreet position; it treats all Sahrawis equally whether or not 
they come from the former colony. The RASD has created a Ministry of 
the Occupied Territories that also caters to southern Moroccan Sahrawis. 
This institution condemns the situation in which these Sahrawis are living 
and considers their collective action part of the national movement. On 
the other hand, there is no speci" c discourse for them related to a politi-
cal settlement of the con# ict based on a decolonization that respects the 
colonial borders, accepting that part of the indigenous population, part of 
the nation, is excluded from the national state project. 
 Morocco, in turn, has contributed to this identi" cation with public 
policies and measures speci" cally deployed to erase any differentiation 
between north and south and other policies that have had the opposite 
effect of that desired. Some examples include the fact that a portion of 
the settlers in Western Sahara were southern Moroccan Sahrawis; using 
collaborationist southern Moroccan Sahrawis to administer the occupied 
zones; the administrative division of the country combining southern 
Morocco with northern Western Sahara in the same regions; the poli-
cies for police control and repressive practices; the policies of, " rst, accul-
turation and then the folklorization of the Sahrawis; the integration of 
Sahrawis from both zones into the Royal Advisory Council for Saharan 
Affairs (CORCAS) on an equal footing and so forth. 
 CONCLUSION 
 Monitoring and analysing the Sahrawi national political protest movement 
reveals that it is not only limited to the territory occupied by Morocco 
but also involves southern Moroccan Sahrawis and appears beyond the 
former colonial border. As many observers have noted, southern Morocco 
is part of the Sahrawi resistance and protest scene. This is not a geographic 
phenomenon, the result of contagion or spillover or due to sympathy or 
emulation. Neither is it a diversification of the Sahrawi nationalist camp or 
a new phenomenon. From its very first manifestations, the national move-
ment has not been limited to the Spanish colonial territory but has also 
included southern Morocco. During the 1950s political protests occurred 
that were repressed by Rabat, and in the 1960s–1970s the Polisario Front 
was partially organized and came to fruition there. After the occupation, 
the area was also a site of resistance and suffered brutal repressions, in 
addition to armed actions. Many of the early activists who were impris-
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oned or disappeared are from this region. For that reason, beginning 
in the mid-2000s, the new leading role of the domestic front has also 
included Sahrawi cities in southern Morocco. This would suggest that 
the anti-colonial and later nationalist protest movement is also a southern 
Moroccan phenomenon. 
 However, this dimension has scarcely been mentioned given the cen-
trality of decolonization, self-determination and the state question in this 
con# ict and on the national agenda. The fact that these elements refer to 
a contiguous but different territory and that the possible consequences 
(de-occupation, referendum, a state) do not affect them directly has not 
stopped southern Moroccan Sahrawis from participating not only in the 
political battle but also in the process of constructing a national identity. 
 This participation in the de" nition of the Sahrawi nation is explained 
by the uniqueness of the process. The " rst factor to consider is that the 
new national identity is articulated around common ethnic elements 
and a colonial experience different to that of their neighbours, to which 
southern Moroccan Sahrawis are not indifferent. The second is related 
to the emancipatory component; what distinguishes a national/national-
ist Sahrawi from an ethnic Sahrawi is the former’s commitment to the 
" ght for independence (“a Sahrawi is someone who defends the national 
cause”), regardless of where they live and how it affects them. Finally, the 
third element is the appreciation of a new non-tribal diversity related to 
fragmentation and dispersion. The new Sahrawi national identity is bor-
derless and integrates Sahrawis under occupation and in Morocco with 
refugees in Algeria and the diaspora, whether near or far. In this frame-
work, the southern Moroccan Sahrawis contribute to and participate in 
the idea of the nation. 
 The failure of the settlement plan, the delay in solving the con# ict and 
the passing of the years have led to the appearance of new realities, making 
the scene even more complex. Forty years after the beginning of the con-
# ict, a solution that seeks to be viable must take these new elements into 
account. One of them is the crystallization of a national Sahrawi identity 
that also has a presence in southern Morocco. While this has not trans-
lated into irredentist demands at this time, the prolongation of the con# ict 
and the authoritarian practices of Morocco could exacerbate the positions 
and help to radicalize demands, breaking the decolonization framework. 
Moreover, this fact means that, whether or not a Sahrawi state is estab-
lished, Morocco must be able to democratically manage this national plu-




  1.  I apply the term “Western Sahara” to the territory of the former Spanish 
colony (between latitude 27° 40′ and latitude 21° 20′) and the term 
“Sahrawi” to the population identi" ed as belonging to indigenous 
Hassaniya-speaking tribal groups, regardless of their geographic location 
and whether this is their primary identifying trait. When I wish to make 
distinctions, I specify their location and origin (Western Sahara Sahrawis 
versus southern Moroccan Sahrawis). The formula  bidanis , which corre-
sponds to an old ethnic identity, is not used, nor is “Moroccan Sahrawis”, 
given that this would require differentiating between Moroccan-born citi-
zens and those who acquired citizenship as a result of the 1976 
occupation. 
  2.  The region of Cape Juby (between the Draa River to the north and lati-
tude 27° 40′) and the town of Tarfaya (Villa Bens) were given to Spain in 
the 1912 Spanish-French treaty that established the Protectorate in 
Morocco, extending the territory of Western Sahara, which was now for-
mally under Spanish control. 
  3.  According to sources, the number of Moroccan settlers has grown from 
150,000 to 750,000. According to data from the High Planning 
Commission (Morocco), in 2015 there were 510,713 inhabitants in the 
territory of whom 18 per cent or 92,176 spoke Hassaniya (Sahrawis); the 
rest, some 420,000, had come to the territory from Morocco. 
  4.  See the studies by Victoria Veguilla on socioeconomic con# icts in Western 
Sahara in which a latent national ethnic element is used by the actors involved; 
the identity element is a political asset for the indigenous minority. 
  5.  In fact, the set of defensive walls built by Morocco between 1981 and 
1987 in Western Sahara extends into southern Morocco to the foothills of 
Djebel Ouarkziz, that is, a hundred kilometres into Moroccan territory. 
  6.  In sum, the area of southern Morocco with a Sahrawi population corre-
sponds to the southern zone of the Spanish Protectorate (Tarfaya, Tan-
Tan, Zak), but extends somewhat north of the Draa River to include 
Guelmin, Assa, Akka and the surrounding areas. 
  7.  In the early 1970s there were some 60,000 Sahrawi refugees in southern 
Morocco. 
  8.  It is dif" cult to precisely quantify the southern Moroccan Sahrawis since 
ethnolinguistic indicators are not included in Moroccan statistics. 
  9.  In the identi" cation process, Morocco defended the principle that the 
Sahrawi tribes located north of the border should participate as a whole. 
On the contrary, the UN established a list of identi" cation criteria that 
gave precedence to ties with Western Sahara (demonstrated with docu-
ments or testimony). 
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 10.  The participants in the Green March (1975) included many southern 
Moroccan Sahrawis. When the government ordered the demonstrators to 
return, several thousands of them decided to stay in the Sahara with their fami-
lies, forming part of the " rst contingent of settlers (some 50,000 in 1975–76). 
Later with the so-called second Green March for the future referendum in 
1991, a new group of southern Moroccan Sahrawis settled in Western Sahara. 
 11.  Ali Omar Yara has observed that since the 1970s the Sahrawi areas in 
southern Morocco (the Assa, Guelmin, Tarfaya triangle) have experienced 
the destruction of their social fabric, followed by the political repression of 
the 1980s–1990s and economic marginalization and misery of the 2000s 
[ http://arso.org.site.voila.fr/AOY.htm ]. 
 12.  In 1992, 24 Sahrawi civilians were arrested in Assa (the so-called Assa 
Group) after participating in a social protest demonstration; they were sen-
tenced to a year in prison. 
 13.  For instance the ASVDH (secretary-general and vice president) and 
CODESA (10 of the 16 members of its executive committee, including the 
president, vice president and secretary-general). 
 14.  Most notably: Ali Salem Tamek, Mustafá Abdel Daiem, Mohamed 
El-Moutaouakil, Aminatou Haidar, Naama Asfari, Yahya Mohamed el 
Hafed Aaza, Sadik Bullahi, Brahim Sabbar, Larbi Messaoud, Ghalia Djimi 
and Banga Cheij. Some of these activists are from southern families who 
moved north in the 1950s. 
 15.  Ali Salem Tamek (Assa, 1975), Mohamed El-Moutaouakil (Assa, 1966), 
El Hussein Lidri (southern Morocco, 1970), Hammadi Elkarsh 
(Guelmin, 1980), Lahcen Zriguinat (Tan-Tan, 1959), Mohamed Rachidi 
(Tan-Tan, 1978), Abdelaziz Dry/Edday (Tarfaya, 1982) and Hamma 
Achrih (Agadir, 1986). 
 16.  http://www.arso.org/rapportcodapso.pdf CODAPSO,  Comité pour la 
Défense du Droit à l’Autodétermination pour le Peuple du Sahara Occidental 
 17.  AMDH,  Informe anual. La situación de los derechos humanos en Marruecos 
durante el año 2008 , Rabat. 
 18.  Irredentism is understood to be the wish to annex territories considered to 
belong to a nation for historical or cultural reasons. In this particular case, 
the people defend their incorporation into a nation to which they feel they 
belong for historical or cultural reasons and consequently to the state that 
will emerge from the " ght for liberation. 
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